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Abstract: Time-limited dispatch (TLD) allows the dispatch of aircraft with faults present 
in their control systems for limited time periods. In order for TLD to be applied to an 
aircraft system it is first necessary to demonstrate that the relevant safety and certification 
requirements are being met by modelling the system in question. To do this existing 
modelling techniques use variations of fault tree analysis and Markov analysis with 
various simplifying assumptions, made to assist in the analytical process. Monte Carlo 
simulation is presented here as an alternative method of analysis, which can deal well with 
the potential difficulties that may present themselves when modelling TLD, such as the 
complex architectures of aircraft systems and dependencies that are introduced when 
applying TLD. In this paper a simple example system is introduced and the application of 
TLD to it is modelled using the existing variation of Markov analysis and a Monte Carlo 
simulation technique. The results obtained using the different techniques are seen to differ 
and a number of reasons are suggested for this difference. 
Keywords: Time-Limited Dispatch, TLD, Monte Carlo Simulation 
1. Introduction 
Time-limited dispatch (TLD) was first used after the introduction of Full Authority Digital 
Electronic Control (FADEC) systems to commercial aircraft in the mid-1980s. Upon their 
introduction FADEC systems assumed the role that had previously been undertaken by 
hydromechanical control (HMC) systems, namely that of governing engine thrust from the 
beginning of fuel metering to the point of fuel shutoff. It was to be the first time that a HMC 
system would be unavailable to pilots in the event of electronic system failure [1]. 
FADEC systems are designed to incorporate redundancy. Critical loops and functions 
have either dual systems or redundant elements. With this in mind and also the high 
reliability of the electronic components that make up the FADEC systems one would expect 
that there would be an increase in control system integrity. This could also be assumed to 
lead to a reduction in the number of delays and cancellations of aircraft due to control 
system failures. However, because the dispatch criteria applied to the aircraft were 
essentially those that were applied to aircraft with HMC systems the frequency of flight 
delays and cancellations increased [2,3]. The dispatch guidelines were too conservative and 
did not take into account the high reliability of individual system components and the 
redundancies contained within the FADEC systems. Accounting for these qualities, dispatch 
would be allowed with faults present in the FADECs. 
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The necessary airworthiness requirements would be met and also aircraft operators and 
passengers would benefit from the reduction in unscheduled maintenance operations. This 
new approach to aircraft dispatch, allowing aircraft dispatch with faults, is called time-
limited dispatch (TLD). 
TLD allows aircraft dispatch with known faults present within the engine control system 
for a limited period of time only. When it is implemented a certain level of system reliability 
must be met. This level was set to match that required of the HMC systems that were used 
before the advent of FADEC systems and specifies a maximum limit of 10 failures per 106 
flight hours (flt. hrs.) for the average loss of thrust control (LOTC) rate of the system [2]. 
The regulations also specify that other restrictions must apply to the system LOTC rate. 
These relate to the instantaneous LOTC rates when operating with faults present within the 
system. For a fault to be dispatchable the instantaneous LOTC rate must be less than 100 
failures per 106 flight hours whilst operating with that fault. The aircraft may be dispatched 
for differing periods of time according to the significance of faults present within the 
system. Depending on the value of the instantaneous LOTC rate for a fault the fault may be 
classified as falling into one of four dispatch categories (FAA Memo, 2001). These are: 
- Do Not Dispatch   -     DND 
- Short Time Dispatch   -     STD 
- Long Time Dispatch   -     LTD  
- Manufacturer/Operator Defined Dispatch -     MDD 
Each of these is dependent upon the likelihood of further faults causing system failure 
given the presence of the dispatchable fault. DND faults prohibit dispatch of the aircraft and 
must be addressed immediately (a LOTC rate of greater than 100 failures per 106 flt. hrs. 
would instigate this). The instantaneous LOTC rate for STD faults must lie between 75 and 
100 failures per 106 flt. hrs. and the rate for LTD faults must be less than 75 events per 106 
flt. hrs. The final dispatch category, MDD, is reserved for faults that don’t fall into any of 
the other categories or do not affect the LOTC rate of the system. 
1.1 Maintenance Strategies 
Two different maintenance strategies may be adopted when applying TLD to a system. 
These strategies are minimum equipment list (MEL) maintenance and periodic inspection 
and repair (PIR) maintenance. It does not matter to which of the fault categories these are 
applied to but it is common for STD faults to be addressed using MEL maintenance and 
LTD faults to be addressed using PIR maintenance. 
MEL maintenance is a time-since-fault repair strategy and, if applied, the exact time of 
occurrence of the fault must be known. At this time a ‘countdown’ of the appropriate 
dispatch time is started and once this countdown reaches zero the fault must have been 
repaired before further dispatch of the aircraft is allowed. This process is illustrated in Figure 
1, where a fault occurs at time t1. As the fault occurs a dispatch interval is initiated. This 
dispatch interval ends at time t2 and once time t2 is reached the fault must be cleared from 
the system in order to allow further dispatch of the aircraft. 
PIR maintenance differs from MEL maintenance in that the exact time of the fault need 
not be known. The system is checked for faults at regular intervals and when a fault is 
discovered it is assumed to have occurred at the midpoint of consecutive inspections. This is 
considered reasonable since the fault will, on average, occur at this time if one assumes that 
the failure rates for faults are constant with time and that the periodic inspection interval is 
less than the mean time between failures (MTBF) of the sum of the failure rates in that 
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category. Once the fault is assumed to have occurred at the midpoint of inspections the 
dispatch interval is assumed begins at this point and the allowable period of dispatch after 
the current inspection is calculated. This means that the inspection interval for a fault 
category cannot exceed twice the dispatch interval for that category. The PIR maintenance 
process is illustrated in Figure 2. On this diagram two periodic inspections are shown, I1 and 
I2. Here a fault occurs at time tf but in this case the exact time of the fault is not known so it 
is only discovered at I2. It is then assumed to have occurred at the midpoint of the two 
consecutive inspections, t1, and a dispatch interval is assumed to have started at this point. 
This then allows dispatch for a time T after I2 until time t2 when the fault must be cleared 
from the system in order for further dispatch to be allowed. 
If PIR maintenance were used to maintain both STD and LTD faults, situations could 
arise where a fault of one category were discovered at inspections for faults of another 
category. In situations such as these it is possible to treat the fault as though it was 
discovered at the next inspection for its own category. To illustrate this, consider a LTD 
fault discovered at an inspection for STD faults. In this case the LTD fault could be treated 
as though found at the next inspection for LTD faults. 
 
1.2 Multiple Faults 
Despite the relatively high reliability of FADEC systems it is still possible that more than 
one fault can be present within the system at any one time. In such situations the faults may 
be cleared from the system in a number of ways, each of which would affect the exposure of 
the system to the faults. A number of examples are outlined below. These are by no means 
exhaustive but serve to provide an indication of the complexities that are potentially 
involved when one attempts to model the application of TLD to a system. The examples 
shown are for the MEL maintenance process. When one attempts to model PIR 
maintenance, a combination of MEL and PIR maintenance, or even the presence of more 
faults, the maintenance options may become more complex. 
Figure 3 shows the occurrence of two faults, A and B, addressed using MEL 
maintenance, which have dispatch intervals ending at t1 and t2 respectively. At t1 a number 
of options are possible. Fault A must be cleared from the system in order to allow further 
dispatch. Also at this time fault B could be allowed to remain in the system, thus allowing 
dispatch until time t2 when it must be repaired. A second option is available. This would be 
to opportunistically repair fault B also, allowing unlimited dispatch of the aircraft from time 
t1. 
Figure 4 also shows the occurrence of two faults, A and B, addressed using MEL 
maintenance. If either were to occur in isolation the dispatch category applied would be 
LTD. However, the simultaneous presence of A and B in the system causes a reduction in 
the dispatch category to STD. As t3 is reached repairs are required in order to allow further 
dispatch interval 
t t1 t2 
Fig. 1:  MEL Maintenance 
 
dispatch interval 
t t1 t2 I2 I1 
T 
tf 
Fig. 2:  PIR Maintenance 
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dispatch of the aircraft. In this situation more options are possible. Clearly, both A and B 
could be cleared from the system allowing unlimited dispatch from t3 or A alone could be 
repaired, allowing dispatch until t2 when B must be repaired or B alone could be repaired, 
allowing dispatch until t1 when A must be repaired for further dispatch to be possible. This 
scenario could be complicated further still if the ordering of the faults A and B dictated 
whether or not the dispatch interval was reduced from LTD to STD. For example, A 
followed by B could lead to the scenario shown in Figure 4, but B followed by A might not 
lead to a reduction in the dispatch interval. 
These examples serve to show some of the complexities involved when applying TLD 
to a system and maintaining that system. When modelling the application of TLD it is 
important that the model used can deal with such complexities, should they arise, in order to 
have reasonable confidence in the results gained. 
2. Example System – Modelling TLD 
Figure 5 shows a block diagram of a simple example system, which consists of two 
essentially identical channels, X and Y. Each channel performs two functions, F1 and F2, 
which, if either fails, will cause that channel to fail. For example, considering channel X, the 
function F1 is performed by the components A and B in parallel and the function F2 is 
performed by the components C, D and E according to the configuration shown. Note that 
there are dependencies between the channels, since components B and E appear in each of 
the channels. The corresponding fault tree for this system is given in Figure 6. Each of the 
components of the system is assumed to have an exponential failure time distribution and 
Table 1 shows the failure rates of each of these components. 
 
 
Table 1: Component Failure Rates 
Component/s Failure rate (per hr) 
A, F 5.0×10-5 
B 3.5×10-5 
C, G 7.5×10-5 
D, H 6.0×10-5 
E 4.0×10-5 
 
Before modelling the system the faults that will be considered dispatchable faults must 
be identified. In the examples studied in [4] and [5] the dispatchable faults all correspond to 
basic events in the fault tree representation of the LOTC top event. In this example 
intermediate events will be included in the dispatch criteria, along with some basic events. 
The reason for this choice is to try to include typical characteristics in the example that occur 
t A
 
t1 B
 
t2 
 
Fig. 3: Multiple Faults (MEL Maintenance) 
t A
 
t1 B
 
t2 t3 
STD 
LT
LT
 
Fig. 4: The Combination of Multiple Faults 
(MEL Maintenance) 
Fig. 5: Example System Block Diagram 
Channel Y 
Channel X 
A 
B 
C 
D E 
F G 
E B H 
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in real systems. For real systems the fault tree would most likely be drawn down to 
component level for the FADEC system and its constituent functions. However, for the 
majority of these components it seems unlikely that they will be included explicitly in the 
dispatch criteria. It would seem more likely that combinations of basic events, represented 
by intermediate events in a fault tree, would correspond to faults that would be included in 
the dispatch criteria for a system. Thus, for this example, the basic events A, B and F, and 
the intermediate events F2X (F2X Fails) and F2Y (F2Y Fails) were chosen as the faults 
included in the dispatch criteria.  
There are two approaches recommended for the modelling of systems to which TLD is 
applied [3]. These are based on fault tree analysis (time-weighted average or TWA) and 
Markov analysis (reduced fault state Markov model). A third approach is proposed in this 
paper as being very well-suited to modelling the application of TLD to systems. This 
approach is Monte Carlo simulation (MCS). The following sections outline the application 
of two of these modelling techniques (reduced fault state Markov, in fact dual fault state 
Markov, and MCS) to the example system given above. The TWA approach is not used here 
since in previous work by the authors on small examples [4,5] results obtained proved to be 
in poor agreement with results obtained using the reduced fault state Markov and MCS 
approaches. 
2.1 Dispatch Criteria 
For both models, before modelling the application of TLD to the example system, a set of 
dispatch criteria must be decided. These dispatch criteria are a list of faults and fault 
combinations and the dispatch categories that will be associated with them. As described in 
the introduction, the dispatch categories are set according to the values of the instantaneous 
failure rates to LOTC. Although the code developed by the authors can be used to calculate 
the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC, and hence set the dispatch criteria, the work 
presented here uses the dispatch criteria obtained for the dual fault state Markov model. This 
was done in order to compare the dual fault state Markov and MCS approaches with as little 
variation between the ways the system was modelled as possible. Calculating the 
instantaneous failure rates to LOTC from the single and dual fault states is not a simple task, 
even for such a simple system. The decision was taken to use the method given in [1], 
Fig. 6: Fault Tree of System Shown in Figure 5 
LOTC 
A 
Ch X Fails 
F1 X Fails F2 X Fails 
Gate 1 B C 
D E 
F 
Ch Y Fails 
F1 Y Fails F2 Y Fails 
Gate 2 B G 
H E 
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wherein the failure rates to LOTC from the fault states are approximated by the probability 
of LOTC for those fault states divided by the flight time. That is, the failure rates are 
approximated by a ‘probability per flight hour.’ However, finding the probability of failure 
from the different system fault states is not necessarily simple for a real, larger, more 
complex system. In the case of this example the relevant fault or combination of faults was 
assumed to be present in the system, the probability of that fault would be set to true and the 
system unavailability calculated. For example, if one wants to find the probability of system 
failure with fault A present then fault A is set to true in the fault tree shown in Figure 6. This 
gives the following Boolean representation of the system top event LOTC (where + 
represents Boolean OR and . represents Boolean AND): 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
GECHGDCGEBHGBFB
EHGBFEDCBLOTC A
..........
....
++++=
++++=
 
(1) 
where LOTCA represents the LOTC of the system given that A is failed. If we use the rare 
event approximation the system unavailability given that A is failed, QSYS|A, is given by: 
GECHGDCGEBHGBFBASYS qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqQ ++++=| , (2) 
where qi represents the probability of failure of component i. This is considered appropriate 
since this will be an upper bound for the system unavailability and as such will be 
conservative. Approximating these qi’s using the exponential distribution 
( )tq ii λ−−= exp1 , (3) 
where λi represents the failure rates given in Table 1, we can calculate failure rates to LOTC 
for each of the single and dual system faults. Therefore, in order to approximate the 
instantaneous failure rate to LOTC with A failed one would then substitute Eqn. 3 into Eqn. 
2 and divide the resultant probability by the length of an average flight. 
Note that a problem occurs when considering the faults F2X and F2Y since a number of 
different scenarios can cause these faults to occur and also that they have a common 
component in E. Thus, when calculating the failure probability with F2X or F2Y failed 
assume the worst-case scenario that E is failed. In this way if one, for example, considers the 
dual fault system state where A and F2X are present in the system the Boolean representation 
of the system top event LOTC is: 
GFBLOTC XFA += .2, , (4) 
which leads to the rare event, upper bound, approximation: 
GFBXFASYS qqqQ +=2,| . (5) 
Using the above technique gives the approximations for the instantaneous failure rates to 
LOTC from each of the single and dual system fault states, given to 3 significant figures 
in Table 2. A time of 10 hours was assumed for the average flight time. Also shown in 
Table 2 is the corresponding TLD category. 
Table 2: Instantaneous LOTC Rates and Associated TLD Categories (Cat) for A 
Dual Fault State Markov Model. Note that LOTC Rates Shown are in Failures Per 
106 Flt Hrs 
 A B F F2X F2Y AB AF AF2X AF2Y BF BF2X BF2Y FF2X FF2Y 
LOTC 0.018 0.025 0.018 75 75 50 35 75 110 50 125 125 110 75 
Cat LTD LTD LTD STD STD LTD LTD STD DND LTD DND DND DND STD 
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Note that there are four fault states whose instantaneous failure rates to LOTC are equal 
to 75 failures per 106 flight hours. This is exactly on the boundary between the STD and 
LTD categorisation. The conservative approach was taken to put these faults into the STD 
category. There are also four dual fault system states that have failure rates above 100 
failures per 106 flight hours, leading to them being categorised as DND faults. 
2.2 Dual Fault State Markov Model 
The LOTC rates given in Table 2 mean that a dual fault state Markov model can be 
constructed that will have the form given in Figure 7. Note the feedback repair transition, 
with corresponding rate µfbk, which is included in the model to aid the calculation of a 
steady-state solution to the model [3]. Because of the way the LOTC rate is calculated the 
solution does not depend on this feedback transition rate. Note that the Markov model 
shown depicts only the failure transitions into single and dual fault states and the LOTC 
state. The failure rate to LOTC from the full-up state, λFU,L, is shown on the model, along 
with the artificial feedback rate, µfbk. Not shown on the model in order to retain the 
diagram’s clarity are repair transitions from each of the single and dual fault states back to 
the full-up system state. The transitions from the full-up state to each of the single fault 
states are labelled on the model with the appropriate failure rate. Not labelled are the 
transitions from the single fault states to the dual fault states which will correspond to the 
occurrence of a further single fault within the system. For example, the transitions to dual 
fault states from state 2 (single fault A) lead to states 7, 8 and 10 (dual faults AB, AF and 
AF2X respectively). These transitions have corresponding rates λB, λF and λF2X. The final 
rates on the diagram lead from each of the single and dual fault states to the LOTC state and 
these correspond to the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC given in Table 2. 
The current state of the Markov model thus requires three more failure rates to be 
calculated, these being λFU,L, λF2X and λF2Y. The first of these, λFU,L, can be calculated in a 
similar way to that used to calculate the instantaneous failure rates to LOTC for each of the 
dispatchable system states, that is to calculate the system unavailability and divide it by the 
average flight time to give a probability per flight hour. Again, the rare event approximation 
Fig. 7: Dual Fault State Markov Model Showing Only Failure Transitions 
LOTC 12 FU 1 
A 2 
B 3 
F 4 
F2X 5 
F2Y 6 
AB 7 
AF 8 
BF 9 
AF2X 10 
FF2Y 11 
λFU,L 
µfbk 
λA 
λB 
λF 
λF2Y 
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is used in order to provide a conservative approximation and the value obtained is 3.13×10-10 
failures per flight hour. 
The final two failure rates into the single fault states with F2X and F2Y failed, λF2X and 
λF2Y, can be modelled using the same probability over flight time approximation. In each 
case we shall take the conservative approximation for calculating the failure probability of 
the fault by simply assuming that the failure of C (in the case of F2X) or G (in the case of 
F2Y) will cause the fault to occur. This yields identical rates for F2X and F2Y of 7.5×10-5 
failures per hour. The Markov model produces state equation 
( ) ( )AQQ tt =& , (6) 
where 
A =









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(7) 
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tQtQtQt 1221 ,,, K=Q , (8) 
where Σi is the sum of the other elements in the ith row of the matrix, µj is the repair rate of 
fault j and λi,L is the instantaneous failure rate to LOTC from state i. Qi(t) is the 
probability of the system being in state i at time t. At steady state these equations satisfy: 
( ) 0AQ =t . (9) 
Now, the dual fault state Markov LOTC rate [3] of the system is given by: 
12
11
1
,
, 1state LOTC in the being ofy Probabilit1
state LOTC  theinto flowy Probabilit
Q
Q
i
Lii
LOTCdual
−
=
−
=
∑
=
λ
λ . 
(10) 
In order to make the system of equations given in Eqn. 9 linearly independent we must 
use the constraint equation, 
.1
12
1
=∑
=i
iQ  (11) 
 Substituting in Eqn. 10 yields, with some rearrangement: 
∑
∑
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The equations represented by columns 2 to 11 of the transition rate matrix A are then 
used to obtain algebraic expressions for the ratios Qi/Q1, which are then substituted into Eqn. 
12, along with all of the appropriate failure rates to give an expression for the dual fault state 
LOTC rate of the system. Setting the repair rates, µi, to be the reciprocal of the appropriate 
STD or LTD intervals allows the LOTC rate to be calculated for different STD and LTD 
intervals. 
2.3 Monte Carlo Simulation Model 
It is proposed in this paper that Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is an approach that is very 
well-suited to modelling the application of TLD to systems. Intricacies introduced by 
different maintenance strategies or the occurrence and ordering of multiple faults are easily 
dealt with in a MCS approach. What follows is a summary of the MCS approach proposed. 
The computer code developed is described in more detail in two previous papers [4,5]. The 
code requires three basic inputs, these being; 
1. A fault tree representation of the system to be modelled, 
2. The failure time probability distributions and associated parameters for the basic 
events in the fault tree, 
3. The dispatch criteria to be applied to the system. 
Along with these it is possible to specify how maintenance will take place. The failure 
probability distributions are used to generate failure times for the basic events. These are 
added to a schedule, used to retain the ordering of faults. The code works by moving 
chronologically through the schedule, changing the status of the relevant basic events and 
using the fault tree structure to see how the system is affected. As faults occur the system 
dispatch criteria must be checked to see if a TLD deadline must be added to the system 
schedule. At TLD deadlines the relevant maintenance must be carried out according to the 
fault that initiated the deadline. The main challenges in constructing the computer code were 
in ensuring the correct ordering of fault occurrences and maintenance deadlines within the 
schedule, then clearing the correct faults from the system at maintenance deadlines. Many 
simulations are executed in order to achieve convergence of results. In order to calculate the 
average LOTC rate of the system the total number of system failures and the total modelled 
system operational lifetime must be stored. 
 For the example system considered here a MEL maintenance approach was applied to 
both STD and LTD faults, since this is the approach most closely represented in the dual 
fault state Markov model. A total operating lifetime for the system of 130000 flight hours 
was used along with a flight time of 10 hours (the same flight time as that used in the dual 
fault state Markov model). The repair strategy used at maintenance deadlines was to repair 
just the fault/fault combination that caused the deadline to be initiated in the first place. For 
example, if one considers Figure 4 and the STD maintenance deadline at t3, both faults, A 
and B, would be repaired at this time and the option would not be taken to repair A or B 
individually. This is in line with the repair transitions included in the dual fault state Markov 
model, which lead from each of the single and dual fault states back to the full-up system 
state. 
3. Results 
The STD interval for the system was set at 200 flight hours and the system was modelled 
using both the dual fault state Markov model and the MCS code for LTD intervals varying 
from 500 to 2500 flight hours. LOTC rates from the MCS code were obtained after 
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convergence to at least 3 significant figures had been reached, with 1000000 simulations 
being performed before the results were checked. After this the LOTC rate was checked for 
convergence after every 50000 simulations and it was necessary for the obtained rate to be 
identical to 3 significant figures a total of three consecutive times for convergence to be 
assumed. The results obtained from these models are shown in Figure 8. Note that the 
system LOTC rate calculated using the MCS is generally higher than that calculated using 
the dual fault state Markov model. The same trend was also observed for other lengths of 
STD interval. Note that if one wanted to set the dispatch intervals for this example, whilst 
ensuring that the system LOTC rate was to be below the maximum allowed of 10 failures 
per 106 flight hours, the MCS code could be expected to give the more conservative dispatch 
intervals since it would yield the maximum allowed LOTC rate for a lower LTD interval 
than that obtained for the reduced fault state Markov model. 
4. Discussion/Conclusions 
The motivation behind the choice of system used to demonstrate the method was to gain 
some insight into where problems could arise when modelling the application of TLD to real 
systems. Even for this small system, a problem that arises is the calculation of failure rates to 
be used in the dual fault state Markov model. The recommended method of approximating 
the failure rates by a failure probability divided by a flight time was simple to apply for this 
small example, upper bounds being used for the probabilities where appropriate. This should 
lead to some conservatism being incorporated into the dual fault state Markov model. 
However, in comparison to the MCS results the dual fault state Markov model seems to 
have produced low values for the system LOTC rate for this small example. Since there are 
no restrictions in the assumptions used in the MCS model and it does not use 
approximations this will produce the more accurate results. 
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